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Brady: Consumer Protection in Florida: Inadequate Legislative Treatment

NOTES
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN FLORIDA: INADEQUATE
LEGISLATIVE TREATMENT OF CONSUMER FRAUDS *
With the great increase in consumer credit' and the steady rise in the
volume of consumer goods marketed each year, consumer protection has
become a major legal problem.2 While much attention has been given to the
products liability area, the economic losses in transactions not involving
personal injury are of equal significance. Deceptive sales practices affect every
class of society, particularly the poor and elderly.3 Such practices are numerous
and varied. Among the most common are: the sale of used or rebuilt merchandise as new, sale of shoddy merchandise, failure to honor repair guarantees,4
spurious special prices, "free" gift offers,5 and referral sales.6 Losses in individual fraud cases run from a few dollars to several thousand dollars. In the
7
aggregate the annual economic loss to consumers runs into the billions.
*EDrroR's NOTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Prize
for the best student note submitted in the fall 1970 quarter.
1. In the past thirty years total outstanding consumer credit has risen from approximately $7 billion in 1939 to well over $122 billion in 1969. See 56 FED. RrsEvE BULL. 54

(1970).
2. Awareness of the magnitude of consumer problems has brought a great expansion in
the literature. The following deal with consumer problems on a broad scale: D. CAPloviTz,
THE PooR PAY MORE (1963); W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DAK SIDE OF THE MAR
LACE
(1968); Murray, The Consumer and the Code: A Cross-sectional View, 23 U. MLm L. REv.
11 (1969); Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U.L. REv. 559 (1968); Symposium-Consumer Protection, 37 GEo.
WASH. L REv. 1013 (1969); Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into
Effective Programs for Protection, 114 U. PA. L. Rxv. 395 (1966).
3. See generally PREsmNT2's COMM. ON Civu. DisoRDEas, REPORT (1968) (unconscionable
business practices are a major cause of unrest in the ghettos); SuBcoMMrrTE ON FRAUDS AND
MISREPRESENTATIONS

AFFEcTING THE ELDERLY, 89m

CONG.,

lsr SESS.,

REPORT ON FRAUD AND

DEcErrIONs AFFECTING THE ELDERLY 1 (Comm. Reprint 1965) [hereinafter cited as REPORT
ON FRAUDS]: "[TMhe elderly of the United States are now clearly the major victims of the

highly organized, high-pressure techniques of the modem day medicine man." Id. at 11.
4. Failure to honor guarantees is the largest source of complaints received by consumer
protection agencies. See, e.g., JoiNT SENATE-HousE CoMM. ON CONSUMER PROTEGTION, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN FLoRIDA 10 (1970) [hereinafter cited as FLORIDA CONSUMER PROTECTION
REPORT].

5. Free gift advertising is an offer of free goods with the purchase of other goods, when
in fact the price of the purchased goods includes the cost of the free item. For a disussion
of Florida statutes on the subject see note 53 infra.
6. Referral sale is a technique whereby the buyer is led to believe he can pay for a
product by commissions on sales made to persons he has refrred to the seller as prospective
customers. The buyer almost invariably collects nothing for referrals since the number of
successful referrals is extremely small and some companies do not bother to follow up
referrals or to remit commissions if successful. Referral sales are especially pernicious because
the consumer is led to buy something he does not really need and cannot afford. Hoping
to make money on the referrals, the consumer instead finds he must pay for overpriced
merchandise and high credit charges.
7. REPORT ON FRAUDS, supra note 3,at 8.
[528]
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CONSUMER PROTECTION IN FLORIDA

Until recently, consumers have had to rely on commercial and tort law for
protection from fraud and inferior merchandise. Private remedies have

proved inadequate, however, to correct these problems.8 This note examines
the inadequacy of private remedies and evaluates recent Florida legislation
directed at protecting the consumer from deceptive sales practices. 9

INADEQUAcY OF TRADITIoNAL REMEDIES FOR FRAUD

Establishinga Legal Case Against Misrepresentations
Traditional remedies for fraud have been ineffective in providing adequate
relief for the aggrieved consumer. Although the consumer has a variety of
theories to choose from, each theory has inherent liabilities that decrease
chances for recovery.10 Under the tort theory of misrepresentation, a consumer
must show that he has been damaged as a result of reliance on a misrepresentation of fact. The consumer must prove that the seller acted with knowledge
of the misrepresentation and with intent to deceive. 1 It is difficult to establish
reliance, knowledge, and intent, however, because of the subjective elements
involved. In the alternative, the consumer may choose to bring suit in
contract, but this is often prevented by loss of contract documents or by
the parol evidence rule. Although many courts now have statutory authority
to modify unconscionable contracts, 13 this is rarely done. 4 The court's reluctance to utilize fully their power to declare contracts unconscionable is
apparently due to being unaccustomed to overtly exercising the extensive
discretion inherent in a concept as vague and elusive as unconscionability5

8. See Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceived Consumers into Effective Programs for
Protection,114 U. PA. L. REv. 395 (196).
9. Florida requirements for the disclosure of finance charges are not included since this
area has been largely preempted by the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act. Other important
consumer issues, such as the holder-in-due-course doctrine and confession of judgment
clauses are beyond the scope of this note. For a discussion of such consumer problems see
Lopucki, The Uniform Consumer Credit Code: Consumer's Code or Lender's Code?, 22 U.
FA. L. REv. 335 (1970).
10. The primary theories the consumer may utilize are misrepresentation, breach of
warranty, and unconscionability. For a complete discussion of private remedies see Hester.
Deceptive Sales Practices and Form Contracts: Does the Consumer Have a Private Remedy?,
1968 Du=n L. J. 831.
11.
Ball v. Ball, 160 Fla. 601, 86 So. 2d 172 (1948).
12. The consumer need not prove reliance under the warranty theory. The seller's use
of promises, samples, or descriptions of merchandise are presumed to be part of the bargain.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-313, Comment 6. For the Florida enactment of the U.C.C.
see FLA. STAT. ch. 672 (1969).
13. E.g., FLA. STAT. §672.302 (1969).
14. See, e.g., Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968);
Lippencott Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Childress, 204 So. 2d 919 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1967).
15. For example, for 160 years Louisiana courts have had statutory authority to void
immoral contracts, but have never done so. Comment, Unconscionable Contract Provisisons:
A History of Unenforceability from Roman Law to the UCC, 42 Tu.. L. REv. 193 (1967).
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The legal view of what constitutes a misrepresentation also inhibits re-

covery. "'Puffing," or exaggerating the quality of sales merchandise, has been
traditionally allowed as a necessary part of the bargaining process. The

consumer is not legally entitled to rely on exaggerations, opinions or predictions of future performance made by the salesman. 16 It is assumed at
law that the consumer is competent to assess the quality of the merchandise
presented and will realistically evaluate a sales pitch.7 In reality, these as-

sumptions may not be justified. The consumer is often naive or incapable of
evaluating products of advanced technology without relying on the salesman
for assistance.18 Courts have restricted the puffing privilege only in dearly
unconscionable cases 19 or when some definite standard of misconduct is

available.- ° As a result, misrepresentation of the quality of merchandise and
many common sales frauds usually fall within the scope of permissible puffing
21
and leave the consumer without a remedy.

16. Stokes v. Victory Land Co., 99 Fla. 795, 128 So. 408 (1930); Williams v. McFadden,
23 Fla. 143, 1 So. 618 (1887); Tonkovich v. South Florida Citrus Indus., Inc., 185 So. 2d
710 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
17. "The legal structure is based on a model of the 'sophisticated' not the 'traditional
consumer' prevalent among low-income families. It assumes ... that the consumer understands the conditions to which he is agreeing when he affixes his signature to an installment
contract. But we have seen time and again, that this assumption does not hold for many
of these consumers. . . . [The law] unwittingly favors the interest of the merchant over
those of the consumer by permitting deviant practices which take advantage of the consumer's ignorance." D. CAPLovrrz, supra note 2, at 188, 189.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1968), where
statements were made to a fifty-one year old widow as a means of committing her to
dancing contracts for $31,000. The court held that the general rule about puffing did not
apply where there is a fiduciary relationship between the parties or where the parties
do not deal at arm's length or the consumer does not have equal opportunity to become
apprised of the truth or falsity of the fact represented. Id. at 908-09. See also Gulf Shore
Dredging Co. v. Hutto, 31 Fla.. Supp. 24 (Cir. Ct. Hillsborough County 1968). See generally
Davenport, Unconscionability and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMi L. REV. 121
(1967).
20. Courts generally utilize the theory of unconscionability only if some objective factor
such as illiteracy of a party to the contract is present. E.g., Soud v. Hike, 56 So. 2d 462
(Fla. 1952); Frostifresh Corp. v. Reynoso, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S. 757 (Dist. Ct, Nassau
County 1965), reu'd in part, 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 964 (2d Dep't 1967). See generally
Davenport, supra note 19 for an attempt to isolate objective factors that have led to findings
of unconsdonability. Where one party is able to point only to a general feeling of unfairness
or one-sidedness of the contract the courts have been reluctant to reform the contract
under the unconscionability doctrine. See, e.g., M. Lippencott Mortgage Inv. Co. v. Childress,
204 So. 2d 919 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1967), in which the court found the elements of a lottery
present in a referral sales contract and held it invalid because of a statutory prohibition
against lotteries and chain letters rather than unconscionable. See also Florida Discount
Centers, Inc. v. Antinori, 226 So. 2d 693 (2d D.CA. Fla.), affd, 232 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1969),
holding a referral sales contract invalid as a violation of the Florida Blue Sky Laws. The
advantages of the unconscionability approach in the referral sales context are discussed in,
Comment, Let the Seller Beware-Another Approach to the Referral Sales Scheme, 22
U. MuAmi L. Rav. 861 (1968).
21. Phony special prices and free gift offers often fall within the permissible puffing
category. See Hester, supra note 10, at 841. Recent cases, however, have tended to restrict
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ParolEvidence Rule - IntegrationClauses
The parol evidence rule bars proof of prior or contemporaneous oral
evidence that may vary the terms of a written contract entered into as the
final expression of the parties agreement. 2 Thus, even if the seller's misrepresentations are actionable, the parol evidence rule may prevent recovery under
contract theory. For example, the consumer and seller may agree on one set
of contract terms orally, but the consumer may sign a different contract upon
assurances by the seller that the terms are the same. In such an instance,
evidence of the oral agreement is barred in order to protect the integrity of the
written contract. 23 In most jurisdictions, however, fraud is an exception to the
parol evidence rule and the consumer may obtain relief under this theory.2 '
The law is less clear where the contract contains an integration clause
claiming that there are no representations, warranties, or promises beyond
those contained in the written instrument.25 Most jurisdictions have taken
the position that "a standard clause in a form contract should not be sufficient
to shield fraud and eliminate a recognized exception to the parol evidence
rule."26 However, a few jurisdictions, including Florida, have held that
since the consumer has signed a statement that no representations were made
by the seller, oral evidence of such representations are not admissible in
27
evidence to prove fraud.
A case that exemplifies the possible inequities of the interplay between the
parol evidence rule and a contract integration clause is Apolito v. Johnson.28
The plaintiff sought to rescind a contract to purchase real estate on the ground
that defendant had fraudulently misrepresented both the price and terms
of purchase. Plaintiff alleged she was told the total price would be 26,000
dollars, but the contract actually provided for a price of 52,000 dollars.
Plaintiff said that before signing the contract she inquired about the higher
price but was assured by the seller, "That don't mean nothing ... Don't
worry about it. That is something that has to be marked in there for the
escrow people." 2 On rehearing, the court held the plaintiff was not entitled
the puffing privilege, particularly in those cases where misrepresentation concerns the condition of the sales goods themselves. Thus, statements that a used car is in "A-I condition"
or in "perfect running shape" or that rebuilt goods are new have been held to be actionable
misrepresentations. See, e.g., Packard Norfolk, Inc. v. Miller, 198 Va. 557, 95 SME. 2d 207
(1956); Touchstone v. Bond, 223 Miss. 487, 78 So. 2d 463 (1955).
22. FLA. STAT. §672.202 (1969).
23. E.g., Wise v. Quina, 174 So. 2d 590,596 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1965).
24. Hester, supra note 10, at 839.

25. See, e.g., Note, Warranties, Disclaimers and the Parol Evidence Rule, 53 COLUM.
L. REv. 858 (1953); Note, Disclaimers of Warranty in Consumer Sales, 77 HAv. L. REV.
318 (1963).
26. Hester, supra note 10, at 838.
27. E.g., Greenwald v. Food Fair Stores Corp., 100 So. 2d 200 (3d D.CA. Fla. 1968).
See also Apolito v johnson, 3 Ariz. App. 358, 414 P. 2d 442 (1966); Newmark v. H. & H.
Products Mfg. Co., 128 Cal. App. 2d 35, 274 P.2d 702 (1954).
28. 3 Ariz. App. 232, 413 P.2d 291 (1966).
29. Id. at 234, 413 P. 2d at 293.
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to rescind the contract because the evidence of the alleged fraud was inadmissible under the parol evidence rule.3- Florida has generally followed the same
line of reasoning although none of the cases have arisen in a consumer
situation.3 1
Cost of Litigation and OtherProblems Inherent in PrivateRemedies
One of the primary limitations of private litigation is that often the

consumer cannot avail himself of any legal recourse. Thus, a mechanic may
increase an automobile repair bill or change a car mileage indicator on a
used car without fear of legal action. It is unlikely the consumer will be able
to prove he was overcharged 32 or learn of the falsified mileage.33 Furthermore,
in many instances consumers fail to bring suit because they are ignorant
of their legal rights, 3' fear legal action by the seller or loss of their credit
rating,3 5 or are frustrated with the legal process.38 Even if the consumer is
willing to go to court, the cost of attorney's fees usually exceeds the small
amount of damages that may be recovered.3 7 In the case of low income con80. 3 Ariz. App. 358, 359, 414 P.2d 442, 443 (1966).
31. E.g., Greenwald v. Food Fair Stores Corp., 100 So. 2d 200 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958),
arising out of the lease of commercial property by a business enterprise. It is noteworthy
that the underlying basis for the decision does not seem to be the parol evidence rule
itself. In each case examined, the court first found that the alleged misrepresentation did
not constitute fraud before going on to find that evidence of the misrepresentation was
barred by the parol evidence rule. In Greenwald, for example, a lessee attempted to rescind
a lease on the basis that the landlord had concealed the fact that a competing store rented
adjoining premises. Since the landlord had reserved the right to rent adjoining stores to
third parties, the court found there was no material misrepresentation. Id. at 202. The
court, however, then went on to base its holding on the parol evidence rule reasoning
that a "no fraud" provision in the lease agreement precluded suit for fraud. See also
East Coast Electronics, Inc. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 855 F.2d 928, 924 (5th Cir. 1966)
(lack of fraud found, decision based on parol evidence rule). But see Oceanic Villas, Inc. v.
Godson, 148 Fla. 669, 4 So. 2d 689 (1941) (contract did not have a no-fraud provision, parol
evidence rule did not bar proof of fraud).
32. A typical example of this type of problem is a 1969 letter from General Motors to
their dealers instructing them: "Unless a safety defect is discovered, no warranty work is
to be performed unless requested by the customer and needed." Hearings on S. 3074 Before
the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Commerce Comm., 91 Cong., 2d Sess. at 28 (1970)
(emphasis added). The consumer was clearly deprived of something to which he had a
right-repairs-as long as he did not discover that parts or workmanship were defective.
General Motors withdrew the instruction upon intervention of the Federal Trade Commission.
33. But see FLA. STAT. §819.35 (Supp. 1970) requiring the registration of mileage on
used automobiles at time of sale to the dealer.
34. See D. CAPLOVrrZ, supra note 2, at 169.
85. Threats of penalties, repossession, garnishment, loss of credit rating, or legal action
are common among unscrupulous sellers. Rice, supra note 2, at 567.
36. "Low income consumers' attitudes toward and knowledge of the law and legal

institutions are derived largely from their experience with the law.... experience pregnant

with oppression, abuse, and frustration." Rice, supra note 2, at 568.
37. See Note, supra note 8, at 409. In addition to the loss stemming from fraud, over
1 billion appliances are covered by some sort of product guarantee. If the product is
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sumers, the cost of litigation is often increased by the necessity of losing a
day's pay to appear in court. This alone may effectively bar suit.as

Small claims courts may ultimately provide the best answer to the problem
of litigation cost.s9 At present, however, most consumers are unaware of the
existence of these courts and are unacquainted with their procedures1 In
addition, although lay plaintiffs may represent themselves, Florida does not
exclude attorneys from small claims courts. 41 Thus, a consumer litigant may

be opposed by professional counsel. This situation greatly reduces the useful42
ness of small claims courts as a consumer remedy.
Rather than pursue a judicial remedy, the consumer may choose to complain to local administrative agencies. However, a complaint to the better
business bureau would be largely ineffective. Local bureaus generally do not

intervene in disputes between businessmen and consumers except to attempt
voluntary reconciliations or to release information on the number of complaints received against a given business.4 3 Also, state44 and local 4 consumer
defective and the seller either refuses to honor the guarantee, has given a guarantee that
does not cover cost of repair or requires the consumer to mail the product to the manufacturer for repair, the cost of seeking legal redress is prohibitive. See Note, The Card Warranty and Consumer Sales, 2 VALrO. L. REv. 358 (1968).
38. Note, Consumer Litigation and the Poor, 76 YAr L. J. 745, 765 (1965).
39. Small claims courts are comparatively informal and inexpensive. Note, supra note
8, at 437. For Florida statutes on small claims courts see FLA. STAT. ch. 42 (1969).
40. See generally INsTTT OF JUDiciAL ADMINISTRATION, SMALL CLAIMS CouaTS IN THE
UNnTD STATES (Supp. 1959); Scott, Small Causes and Poor Litigants, 9 A.B.A.J. 457 (1923).
41. Attorneys are not statutorily barred from Florida small claims courts nor does it
appear to be within the judge's discretion to exclude them. See generally FLA. STATS ch.
42 (1969). But see Prudential Ins. Co. v. Small Claims Court, 76 Cal. App. 2d 379, 173 P.2d
38 (1946), holding: "Ifone of the litigants in such a court could employ counsel it would
of necessity mean that the poor untrained litigant who could not afford to pay such costs
would be at a disadvantage." Id. at 383, 173 P.2d at 40, 41. As stated by Roscoe Pound:
"[iMt is a denial of justice in small causes to drive litigants to employ lawyers." Pound,
The Administration of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARv. L. REv. 302, 318 (1913). For a
detailed discussion of the legal and psychological obstacles confronting laymen in small
claims courts, see Comment, The Persecution and Intimidation of the Low-Income Litigant
as Performed by the Small Claims Court in California, 21 STAN. L. REv. 1657 (1969).
42. Note, supra note 8, at 438. See also Comment, supra note 41, at 1662. It is argued
that if lawyers are excluded from the small claims courts, nonlegal personnel who appeal
regularly on behalf of sellers would quickly acquire an expertise in handling small claims beyond the capacity of the individual litigant. Hence, the only effective means of establishing
equality of sellers and consumers in small claims courts would be to supply consumer litigants with counsel or paralegal personnel to assist them. Id. at 1681.
43. Note, supra note 8, at 405; see Comment, Consumer Protection in Michigan: Movement Towards Some Long-Needed Reforms, 68 Micsi. L. Rxv. 926 n.238 (1970). See also
Project, The Direct Selling Industry: An Empirical Study, 16 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 890, 931-42
(1969).
44. The Florida Legislature established a division of consumer affairs in 1967, FLA. STAT.
§570.283 (1969).
45. E.g., both Jacksonville and Miami have established consumer affairs offices. FWROmA
CoNSUMR PROTON REPORT, supra note 4, at 2. The function of these agencies is to
receive complaints from consumers,

investigate complaints, refer violations of laws to

appropriate law enforcement agencies, and act as consumer advocates before local governmental bodies. The Jacksonville office is also a lt.Qize tO prosecite violations of thq
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protection offices have no authority to effect a recovery, but they may serve
as an intermediary between buyer and seller.46 As a result "consumers in
Florida have no viable, effective remedy when the loss they suffer is not
sufficient to warrant engaging a lawyer to represent them."4 7 Such inability
of the individual consumer to recover for misrepresentation may encourage
an increase in consumer fraud. Secure in the knowledge that most consumers
will find the cost of litigation prohibitive, the fraudulant seller is encouraged
to conduct his business on a large scale; reducing his occasional individual
losses to a predictable cost of doing business. 48
The judicial attitude toward unconscionable contracts further reduces
the deterrent effect of a successful individual 'suit. In Frostifresh Corporation
v. Reynoso49 a sales contract was negotiated in Spanish but drafted in English,
a language with which the buyer was not familiar. The salesman convinced
the buyer that the product would cost nothing because the buyer would
receive commissions on referral sales made to his neighbors and friends.
However, the price, service charges, and credit charges were grossly excessive.
Although holding the contract unconscionable, the court allowed the seller
a reasonable profit (instead of wholesale costs) in addition to trucking and
reasonable service and finance charges.- Thus, unless the buyer is able to
return the sales item, a seller may be able to write unfair and illegal contracts
confident he will recover at least his costs and a reasonable profit.A more liberal judicial attitude toward application of the unconscionable
contract doctrine, modification of the puffing privilege and limitation of
the parol evidence rule could do much to improve the lot of consumers.
Nevertheless, case law alone cannot prevent fraud. Compensation of victims
is ineffective to deter fraud because it involves only isolated individuals. Relief sought in individual cases does not enjoin fraudulent activities but only
seeks compensation for the parties actually before the court. Unscrupulous
sellers can still derive a significant long-term profit from their fraudulent
dealings with consumers. Furthermore, changes in the substantive law of
fraud may come too slowly when fraud is defined on a case-by-case basis. Also,
factual variations in particular cases encourage litigation - the cost of which
is often prohibitive. Finally, judicial conceptions of fraud lag behind the
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (FLA. STAT. §§817.70-.75 (1969)). However, neither
office has authority to seek a judicial recovery on behalf of defrauded customers. Despite

lack of enforcement power, mediation succeeded in recovering $157,545 in Jacksonville and
$75,000 in Miami during fiscal year 1969. JACKSONVLLE CONSUMER ArvaIs DvIsioN,
REPORT 3 (1970); MIAMI CONSUMER PROTECTION DIVISION ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1970).

ANNUAL

46. For example, the Florida Division of Consumer Affairs has no enforcement power of
its own and serves only as a clearing house for complaints. FLA STAT. §570.283 (1969).
47. FLORIDA CONSUMER PROTrON REPORT, supra note 4, at 31.
48. See Rice, supra note 2, at 563-67.

49. 54 Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S. 2d 964 (2d Dep't 1967), rev'g 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274
N.Y.S. 2d 757 (Dist. Ct., Nassau County 1966).
50. 54 Misc. 2d at 120, 281 N.Y.S. 2d at 965.
51. But see Gulf Shore Dredging Co. v. Hutto, 31 Fla. Supp. 24 (Cir Ct. Hillsborough
County 1968), in which the court allowed the seller a reasonable profit but awarded the
consumer interest on the excess profit as well as reasonable attorney's fees.
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latest form of deception and do not serve to deter misconduct. Other methods
of defining, preventing, and compensating victims of fraud are needed.
FLORIDA CRIMINAL AND CIVIL STATUTES

The inadequacy of private litigation has prompted many states to enact
penal statutes designed to protect purchasers from fraudulent businessmen. 52
Florida has enacted statutes prohibiting misleading advertising-5 and making
specific types of fraudulent activities illegal. 4 However, criminal convictions
may be hard to obtain because of difficulties in proving criminal intent and
in motivating local officials to bring criminal actions against businessmen.
Consequently, the effectiveness of these statutes would seem questionable.
A number of civil statutes that regulate specific types of fraudS5 5 have
generally been more successful than criminal statutes. An outstanding example
is the 1969 Home Improvement Sales and Finance Act.5 6 Home improvement
frauds usually involve a contract for improvements on the home. The seller
promptly sells the consumer's note to a bank or finance company. Work either
never begins or is done poorly, and the seller then disappears leaving the
consumer to pay the holder of the note.57 The Home Improvement Act
requires licensing of home improvement contractors 5 and regulates contract
terms. 9 The Act also provides for a cooling-off period.- prohibits failure
to perform or misrepresentation of any material fact in procuring the contract,
proscribes other frauds incidental to home improvements, 61 and makes holders
52.

E.g., HAwA.

WASH. REV.CODE ANN

Ryv. LAws §§11373-74

(1968); MIcI CoMP. LAws §750.33

(1948);

§9.05.010 (Supp. 1970).

53. FLA. STAT. §817.06 (1969). In addition, the 1970 Florida Legislature enacted a statute
prohibiting advertisement of free gifts if such advertisement would "reasonably lead a
person to believe that he may receive . . . something of value, entirely or in part without
a requirement of compensation . . . " FLA. STAT. §817.415 (2) (b) (Supp. 1970). A violation
of the law entities the person to whom the offer is made to receive the item without cost
or further obligation. FLA. STAT. §817.415 (4) (Supp. 1970). Both the attorney general and
the commissioner of agriculture are entitled to sue for an injunction against violations.
The attorney general has construed the Act to encompass offers of gifts made for nominal
consideration if hidden strings are attached (such as purchase of a high priced cabinet
and a maintenance contract for a sewing machine). Op. ATr'y GE. FLA. 70-104 (1970).
However, it is unlikely that the Act will be construed to reach more pernicious forms of
free gifts such as inclusion of the price of the free item in the purchase of the required
item. This deficiency is due to the fact that the Act aims only at eliminating hidden
obligations inherent in accepting the free gift. Even though the consumer does not realize
the price of the required purchase is exorhibtant, he is aware of the full amount to be
paid if he is to receive his gift. Consequently, the Act probably does not apply to this
situation.
54. See generally FLA. STAT. ch. 817 (1969).
55. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §559.25 (1969) (regulating going-out-of-business sales); FLA. STAT.
§570.284 (1969) (unsolicited merchandise deemed a gift).
56. FLA. STAT. §§520.60-.992 (1969).
57. See W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, THE DARK SImE OF m MAxm'ncE 94-25 (1968).
58. FLA. STAT. §§520.60-.68 (1969).
59. FLA. STAT. §§520.71-.74, .81, .88 (1969).
60. FA. STAT. §520.12 (1969).
61. FLA. STAT. §§520.90, .91 (1969).
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of consumer notes subject to the same defenses for breach of contract and fraud
as the seller. 62 The statute has virtually ended home improvement frauds in
Florida.3

Although specific statutes may deal effectively with a particular problem,
they do not provide satisfactory protection from frauds in general. For
example, Florida has passed detailed legislation governing the sale of used
television tubes as new -even requiring that the condition of the tubes as
used or new be noted on sales receipts.- The law brings television tubes under
control but leaves completely unregulated the sale of thousands of other products equally subject to deceptive selling practices. Rather than piecemeal
legislation, a broader protective device is needed. 65 The remainder of this
note considers such legislative provisions that may be useful to consumers:
the cooling-off period, 66 the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices ActP6 the
Federal Trade Comission Act,6s and the Florida Unfair Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Act.69
Coouc,-OrF PmuoD
Cooling-off legislation is aimed at neutralizing high pressure door-to-door
sales techniques by granting the buyer a period of time in which to reconsider
the sales contract outside the presence of the salesman. A statutory period
is set during which the buyer retains the right to cancel the sales contract without regard to cause. The consumer need not risk litigation nor prove fraud
in order to rescind. Consequently, a cooling-off statute provides consumers
an important new protection from puffing and misrepresentation.7
The Florida cooling-off act is based on the home solicitation provision
of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code.7 1 The Act provides a three-day coolingoff period for all sales of foods and services72 solicited at any place other than
the seller's permanent business address.P Purchasers have until midnight of the
62. FLA. STAT. §520.88 (1969).
63.

FLORIDA CONSUMER PROTECrION REPORT, supra 4, at 8.

64. FLA. STAT. §§817.53, .56 (1969).
65. See W. MAGNUSON &J. CARPER, supranote 57, at 66.
66. FLA. STAT. §§501.021-.051 (Supp. 1970).
67. FLA. STAT. §§817.69-.75 (1969).
68. 15 U.S.C. §§41 et seq. (1964).
69. FLA. STAT. §§817.76-.85 (Supp. 1970).
70. Several jurisdictions have enacted cooling-off statutes: CONN. GEN. STAT. Ra,. §42-137
(Supp. 1969); HAwAI REV. LAws §476-5 (1968); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/2, §2628 (Supp.
1971); MASS. GEq. LAws ANN. ch. 255D, §14A (1968); MIcH. CoMP. LAws §445.1203 (1) (1967);
N. J. REv. STAT. §17:160-61 to -61.9 (Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. tit. 73, §500-202(c) (4) (Supp.
1970); R. I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§6-28-1 to -8 (Special Supp. 1968); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9,
§2454 (Supp. 1969); WASH. Rv. CODE §63.14.154 (Supp. 1970).
71. UNIFORM CONSUMER CAuEIT CODE §5.204.
72. FLA. STAT. §501.025 (Supp. 1970). Exceptions are made for the sale of insurance
and farm equipment. FLA. STAT. §501.035 (Supp. 1970). The door-to-door sales act applies
to cash sales in excess of $25. FLA. STAT. §501.021 (1) (Supp. 1970). In contrast, the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code provision applies only to installment sales (4 or more payments).
UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE

§1.301 (8).

73. FLA. STAT. §501.021 (1) (Supp. 1970).
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1971
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third business day after the sales contract is signed to cancel the transaction
without regard to cause. The buyer has a right to withhold any goods in his
possession if the seller fails to return the downpayment within ten days of
cancellation and the buyer may keep the goods if the seller does not comply
within forty days.74 However, the seller may retain a cancellation fee amounting to the cash downpayment not to exceed fifty dollars or five per cent of the
selling price, whichever is less. 75 Delivery of goods or partial performance of
services does not cut off the right to rescind or entitle the seller to any com6
pensation other than the cancellation fee.7
This statute extends the protection given Florida consumers under two
other cooling-off statutes. The Federal Truth-in-Lending Act7 7 provides for a
three-day cooling-off period on any consumer credit transaction secured by an
interest in the buyer's residence7 a The federal legislation is broader than the
Florida statute in that it extends to sales contracts wherever they are executed
but it does not apply unless the seller seeks the security of a mortgage. In
addition, the Florida cooling-off act supplements the cooling-off provisions
of the Home Improvement Sales Act,7 9 which provides a buyer forty-eight
hours to rescind a home improvement contract, wherever executed, without
payment of a cancellation fee.8
Although it would initially appear that the new cooling-off act has
been carefully drafted to avoid loopholes, it has several serious weaknesses.
First, the consumer may not realize he has a right to cancel or that cancellation must be done by mail.81 The seller is placed under no obligation to
inform the consumer of his right to rescind. Instead the Act requires a standard
contract provision in conspicuous print to inform the consumer8 2 Despite
the dear language of the notice clause, the experience with form contracts
under installment sales legislation has been that consumers only occasionally
read and seldom fully understand contract provisions.8 3 This is particularly
true of the poor and elderly who are the most frequent victims of high pressure sales. A more effective method to call attention to the right of rescission
is to require a cancellation form separate from the contract form. Sellers,
however, have opposed such a requirement on the ground that it "invites
cancellation."8 4
74. FLA. STAT. §501.021 (2) (Supp. 1970).
75. FLA.STAT. §501.021 (1) (Supp. 1970).
76.
77.
78.
79.

FLA. STAT. §501.031 (2)(b) (Supp. 1970).
Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1601-77 (Supp. 1970).
Consumer Credit Protection Act §125, 15 U.S.C. §1635 (Supp. 1970).
FLA. STAT. §§520.60-.99 (1969).

80.

FLA. STAT. §520.72 (1969).

81. Written notice of cancellation must be given and shall be effective upon postmarking. "Notice of cancellation need not take a particular form and is sufficient if it
indicates by any form of written expression the intention of the buyer not to be bound
." FLA. STAT. §501.025 (Supp. 1970).
82. FLA. STAT. §501.031 (2) (Supp. 1970).
83. D. CAPLOVITZ, THE PooR PAY MoRE 188, 189 (1963).
84. See Sher, The "Cooling-Off" Period in Door-to-Door Sales, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 717,
762 (1968). As a result of "seller" resistance, only Hawaii and the federal act have adopted
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Another limitation of the Act's effectiveness is that consumers may not
discover the need to rescind until after the cancellation period has passed.
For example, one of the advantages of cooling-off legislation is that it allows
more leisurely examination of the terms of the contract. Accordingly, the
Florida act requires that the seller leave a copy of the contract with the
consumer.8 5 However, if the seller delays compliance until after the normal
three-day period has run, the buyer's right of cancellation will terminate immediately upon delivery of the contract, thus precluding the buyer's examination of its terms.88 The Act would be more effective if the cooling-off period
did not begin to run until the buyer received a copy of the contract.
An inherent limit on the effectiveness of the cooling-off legislation is that
the cancellation period is too short to remedy or prevent many types of
deceptive sales practices. A typical case would be the offer of a free food
freezer in connection with a year's supply of food. In reality, the supply of
food may be low grade and inadequate, and the price may include double
or triple the retail value of the freezer. The poor quality of the food is often
not discovered until delivery, and the excessive price may not be discovered
until the consumer starts to make the payments.8 7 These events usually do
not occur until after the statutory period has run. However, an extended
cancellation period would add great uncertainty to the sales process88 and a
slightly longer period is unlikely to provide sufficient time in which to discover
the fraud. s9 Consequently, it is unlikely that the Act will affect deceptive sales
practices where the desirability of cancelling the contract is not immediately
apparent. Indeed, even in the case of high pressure sales, in which the consumer realizes an immediate desire to rescind, the effectiveness of the Act is
likely to be diminished by inadequate notice of the rescission clause.
Enforcement of the cooling-off act also presents a problem. Unlike the
Uniform Consumer Credit Code, which establishes an administrator with
broad powers of enforcement," no state officer is designated to enforce the Act.
If sellers refuse to rescind contracts under the statute, the state would be
unable to move for an injunction to secure compliance, and consumers would
be forced to go into court to enforce their rescission rights. Thus, one of the
primary purposes of the cooling-off legislation (to keep consumers out of
court) would be defeated.

this procedure. Consumer Credit Protection Act §125, 15 U.S.C. §1635 (Supp. 1970);
HAw Ai Rv. lAws §476-5 (Supp. 1970).
85. FrA. STAT. §501.031 (1) (Supp. 1970).
86. For a general discussion of this and other problems of cooling-off periods see Sher,
note 84 supra.

87. See Note, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation: The Elimination
of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618, 630 (1969).
88. Id.
89. See Sher, supra note 84, at 758.
90. Uniform Consumer 'Credit Code §6.198(1). Violation of the seller's obligations is a
misdemeanor. F_.A. STAT. §50.051 (Supp. 1970).
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Uniform Deceptive TradePracticesAct
One consumer protection idea receiving recent attention is the use of
an injunction against deceptive sales practices.91 If injunctive relief could be
sought by private parties on behalf of the public it would be an effective
method of combating fraud. Private suits, it should be noted, are necessary
even where a public official is authorized to seek injunctions since public
officials do not have the manpower to carry numerous fraud cases to trial.92
One theory of injunctive action is to classify deceptive sales practices as
a public nuisance and to argue for private right of enforcement. 93 However,
this theory has not received general recognition by the courts.9Y4 A more
realistic method of establishing a private right to sue for injunctive relief
against fraud is the utilization of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices
95
Act, a modified version of which was adopted in Florida.
Adoption of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act was prompted by
the unsatisfactory condition of the law regulating unfair competition rather
than by dissatisfaction with consumer remedies.9 6 The Act establishes twelve
classes of actionable conduct that may be enjoined by proper parties.9 7 The
injunctive relief provided does not require proof of monetary damage, nor
does it exclude an injunction if a remedy for damages is available at law.98
An injunction may be issued even though the defendant had no intent to
deceive and even where the deceptive trade practice simply involved misleading rather than false statements of fact by the seller.9 9 In addition, the Act
permits the court discretion to award attorney's fees if the seller engaged in a
deceptive trade practice with an intent to deceive. 1° Thus, the Uniform
91. See, e.g., Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, 76 YA=E L.J. 485 (1967); Rice, Remedies Enforcement Procedures and the

Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U.L. REv. 559, 579-83 (1968); Starrs, The
Consumer Class Action-Part I: Considerations of Equity, 49 B.U.L. Rav. 211, 241-45 (1969).
92. The Federal Trade Commission receives about 9,000 complaints yearly and can
investigate only one out of 8 or 9. Of the complaints investigated, less than 10% result in
a cease-and-desist order. Hearings on H.R. 14931 and Other Class Action Bills Before the
Subcom. on Consumer Protection of the House Comm. on Commerce and Finance, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. at 46 (1970) (testimony of Congressman Corman) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on H.R. 14931].
93. This sort of procedure has been used to enjoin violations of state usury laws. See
Comment, Commercial Nuisance: A Theory of Consumer Protection, 33 U. Cm. L. RLv. 590

(1966).
94. See Rice, supra note 91, at 576-79.
95. FLA. STAT. §§817.69-.75 (1969). See Uniform Deceptive Trade PracticesAct §2(12), 9A
UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED (Supp. 1967).
96. See Starrs, supra note 91, at 243.
97. FLA. STAT. §817.71 (1969). Compare the common law approach in Builders Supply
Co. v. Acton, 56 Fla. 756, 47 So. 822 (1908).

98. FLA. STAT. §817.72 (1969).
99. FLA. STAT. §817.72 (1) (1969).
100.

FLA. STAT. §817.72(2) (1969).
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Deceptive Trade Practices Act has important potential as a consumer protection device.
Among the practices prohibited by the Act are: undisclosed substitution
of goods for those requested by a consumer; misrepresentation of the source
or sponsorship of goods or services; sale of second-hand goods as new; misrepresentation of the uses or benfits of a product; false special prices or going
out of business sales; and false advertising and bait advertising.101 Although
02
many of these practices are regulated in some degree by other Florida laws,
the injunctive relief provided by the Act should provide a useful additional
remedy to consumers. However, the Florida version of the Act does not indude the model act's twelfth category of deceptive sales practices that encompasses conduct by the seller that "creates a likelihood of confusion or of
misunderstanding."' 03 Under the Florida scheme, such common practices as
referral sales, sales resulting from undue influence, free gift schemes, violations
of usury laws, and failure to observe prescribed installment sales contract
forms cannot be enjoined. This restriction of the actionable types of consumer
fraud greatly reduces the Act's usefulness. While it is arguable that the catchall twelfth category would impose too much uncertainty on sellers seeking
definite guidelines for behavior, it is likely that an elastic clause would be
interpreted in a similar manner as the unfair trade practice clause of the
Federal Trade Commission Act 0 4 or the unconscionability section of the
Uniform Commercial Code.10 5 Consequently, inclusion of this section would
have added considerable utility to the Florida legislation.
Satisfying standing requirements of the Florida Deceptive Trade Practices
Act is an even more serious problem. On the surface there would seem to be no
question that a consumer could bring a class action pursuant to the Act. 0 6
If, however, a consumer who has discovered that a merchant is engaging in
deceptive trade practices is not in danger of being deceived again and therefore is not "likely to be damaged" within the terms of the Act. This analysis
is supported by two lower court decisions indicating that "a member of the
public, as such" has no standing to sue under similar language of the Lanham
Federal Trademark Act. 0 7 Nonetheless, the leading advocate and principal
draftsman of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act supports the view
that it allows consumer class actions to obtain injunctions. 10 "The social

101.

102.
103.
(Supp.
104.

§817.71 (1969).
See, e.g., notes 53-55 supra.
FLA. STAT.

UNrFoRm DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACriC s ACr §2 (12). 9A UNIFORM LAws ANNoTATED

1967).
15 U.S.C. §45 (a) (1) (1964).

105. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-302.
106. The Act provides that "any person likely to be damaged" may bring suit. FLA. STAT.
§817.72 (1969).
107. Marshall v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. CO., 170 F. Supp. 828, 835 (D. Md. 1959);
Carpenter v. Rohm & Hass CO., 109 F. Supp. 739 (D. Del. 1952), aff'd, 201 F.2d 671 (3d Cir.

1953).
108.

See Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade

PracticesAct, 76 YALE L.J. 485 (1967).
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interest in supression of commercial deception should... override the brittle
logic of this legalistic paradox. Enlightened consumers should be allowed
to satisfy the standing requirement... through a class suit on behalf of their
less fortunate brethren."109
Unfortunately, there are no cases on point in those states that have
had the Uniform Act for several years; 1 a fact that may argue against the
existence of a consumer action. However, the argument on behalf of a consumer action has received some support in a recent Illinois case. 11 In a decision on the various pre-trial motions of the parties, the court determined
that credit customers of a department store were entitled to sue as a class under
the Uniform Act since the Act "being a remedial statute, must be liberally
construed."1 22 In view of the unclear language of the Act, Florida courts
may be hesitant to adopt this interpretation. Although such an interpretation
would be beneficial to consumers and involve little disadvantage to businessmen,1"3 the existence of a consumer action under the Act remains an open
question.
Federal Trade Commission Act
Types of Fraud Prohibited.The Federal Trade Commission represents a
major governmental effort in fraud prevention. The Commission has jurisdiction over "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in commerce.""14 The agency is given power to issue cease-and-desist
orders and may seek permanent injunctions against fraud.125 The language
of the Federal Trade Commission Act is sweeping and leaves the task of defining unfair or deceptive acts in the combined hands of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and the courts. The broad language of the statute provides sufficient authority to regulate new types of fraud. For example, although
no federal law prohibits lottery devices, the FTC has done so by administrative
regulation 1 6 The comprehensiveness of this statute contrasts favorably with

the proliferation of specific state statutes that have left many areas of fraud
unregulated.
109. Id. at 500.
110. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. §§42-115(c)-(f) (Supp. 1970); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
6, §§2531-37 (Supp. 1970); GA. CODE ANN. §§106.701-.706 (1968); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121-1/2,
§311-18 (Supp. 1968); OHio REv. CODE §§4165.01-.04 (Supp. 1970); OKLA. STAT. tit. 78,
§§51-55 (Supp. 1967).
111. Holstein v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 68 Ch. 275 (Cir. Ct., Cook County, IM. 1969),
cited in Starrs, supra note 91, at 242 n.198a.
112. Starrs, supra note 91, at 242 n.198a.
113. Injunctive actions against fraud involve relatively little disadvantage to businessmen
in comparison with class actions for compensatory damages. A court judgment to enjoin
fraudulent business behavior involves no monetary damages. Furthermore, there is little
incentive to bring a nuisance suit against the business since no monetary judgment is
involved.
114. 15 U.S.C. §45 (a) (1) (1964).

115. 15 U.S.C. §45 (b) (1964).
116. See FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bros., 291 U.S 804 (1934).
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The FTC Act also has other advantages over common law standards. There
is no need to prove intent to deceive on the part of the seller; the mere
likelihood of deception is enough." 17 Furthermore, the FTC is not bound by
the reasonable man standard in measuring the likelihood that a statement will
mislead. Instead, a statement may be misleading if it would be likely to
deceive a significant number of persons of below average intelligence. 11 s
Literal truthfulness, 119 nondisclosure of material facts, 20 and sales exaggerations' 2' may be prohibited if they tend to mislead. Thus, the Act protects
a vast number of consumers disregarded by the common law.
Jurisdiction. One of the major weaknesses in the Federal Trade Commission Act is the limitation of jurisdiction to frauds "in commerce" rather than
frauds "affecting commerce."' 122 Purely intrastate activities are therefore not
subject to regulation. The FTC also has limited manpower resources and is
not able to adequately handle the volume of complaints reaching it every
8
year."
Enforcement Powers. The most serious limitation on the effectiveness
of the FTC is the restricted scope of the Commission's enforcement powers.
The Commission is not authorized to seek temporary injunctions but instead
must rely on cease-and-desist orders, which may be appealed to the courts
within sixty days after issuance. 124 If consent to the order is not obtained,
the exhaustion of appeals may take several years, during which the seller is
free to continue business as usual. 25 The classic example of enforcement
delay is the Holland Furnace case, 28 which required twenty-nine years for
successful termination by the Commission. In December 1986 the company
agreed to an FTC consent order restraining misleading advertising claims. 27
Although complaints against the company continued, a second proceeding
was not initiated by the FTC until 1954.128 Four years later a cease-and-desist
order was issued. 29 Holland ignored the court decree enforcing the order, and
117. D.D.D. Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1942).
118. See., e.g., Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1944).
119. Bennett v. FTC, 200 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1952).

120. Failure to reveal certain important information in the advertising of food, drugs,
devices, and cosmetics may be considered unfair and deceptive. 15 US.C. §55 (a) (1) (1964).
121. Millstein, The FederalTrade Commission and False Advertising, 65 CoLUM. L. R.v.
439, 469 (1964).
122. FTC v. Bunte Bros., Inc., 312 U.S. 349 (1941).

128. See note 92 supra.
124. 15 U.S.C. §45 (b) (1964).
125. It is a relatively simple procedure to delay the imposition of an order for up to
four years. Hearings on S. 3074 Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 11 (1970) (testimony of FTC Chairman Weingardner).
126. This action was initially brought in 1936. Holland Furnace Co., 24 F.T.C. 1418

(1986).
127. Id. at 1414.
128. See, In re Holland Furnace Co., 55 F.T.C. 55 (1958).
129. Id. at 90, afj'd, 295 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1961); Holland Furnace Co. v. FTC, 295
F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1961).
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in 1965 was fined 100,000 dollars for contempt of court. 80 The incentive
to ignore the court order is apparent since the Holland Furnace Company
made approximately $30 million a year from its operation. 3
In view of the delays in obtaining enforcement of cease-and-desist orders,
several statutes were proposed to Congress in 1969 allowing the FTC to seek
temporary injunctions to prohibit questionable conduct until final disposition
of the cause.132 Violations of the injunction could be punished as contempt
of court. None of these bills passed.
Unfair Trade Practicesand Consumer ProtectionAct
Types of Fraud Prohibited. The original version of the unfair trade

practices act proposed to the Florida Legislature adopted the FTC language
and prohibited "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce."' 33 This provision did
not pass the legislature and the final bill limits deceptive trade practices to the
same eleven types of misrepresentation prohibited by the Florida version of the
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.1 34 As a result, the Act shares one of the
defects of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act: it fails to cover many
common consumer frauds3 5 and has no potential for expansion to new types
of deception.
Businessmen have argued that deceptive trade practice statutes must

specifically describe prohibited practices in order that affected parties will
have sufficient notice to allow them to adjust their conduct. Under language
130. In re Holland Furnace Co., 341 F.2d 548 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965).
It is noteworthy that Holland Furnace Company continued its operations notwithstanding a

number of instances in which it was successfully sued for common law fraud by individual
homeowners. Holland simply went on defrauding others. See, e.g., Holland Furnace Co. v.
Robson, 157 Colo. 347, 402 P.2d 628 (1965).
131.

W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER, Tim DaRK SIDE OF TM

MA RmKET.cE 23 (1968).

132. See Hearings on H.R. 14931, supra note 92, at 2.
133. See Fla. H.R. 581, 4219 (3) (1970). An incidental effect of the "unfair competition"
phrase, however, would be to incorporate a large body of federal antitrust law into Florida
law. Several states have adopted statutes based on this language. See, e.g., MASS. GN. LAws
ANN. ch 93a, §§1-9 (Supp. 1969); Mo. REv. STAT. §§407.010-.130 (Supp. 1969); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§49-15-13 (Supp. 1969). Some statutes make unconscionable business practices subject to
injunction. See, e.g., N.Y. Exac. LAw §63 (12) (McKinney Supp. 1967). While the UCC
standard of unconscionability is suitably broad, it does not have the benefit of the large
number of administrative regulations and court decisions that have interpreted the FTC
Act.
134. Compare FLA. STAT. §817.77(4) (a)- (k) (Supp. 1970), with FLA. STAT. §817.7(1)
(a)- (k) (1969).
135. For example, failure to honor repair warranties is the most common source of
consumer complaints, but is not enjoinable under the Act. Similarly, of five common frauds
listed by the FTC (bait advertising, phony special prices, referral sales, free gift frauds, and
fear sales) only the first two are enjoinable under the Act. See W. MAGNUSON & J. CARPER,

supra note 131, at 8. Under the present statute the Holland Furnace Company case, in
which salesmen represented themselves as safety inspectors, dismantled furnaces, condemned

them as hazardous, and then refused to reassemble them, would not be actionable. See also
text accompanying notes 101-105 supra for a further discussion.
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similar to the FTC Act, however, prohibited conduct is specifically defined
by interpretive regulations or advisory opinions of a designated official. 38
The agency is then prohibited from instituting action against practices approved in the regulations without first giving reasonable notice that the
regulation or opinion has been withdrawn. 13 7 Consequently, since the need
for guidelines for businessmen is satisfied, there would appear to be no
reason for not adopting language simply prohibiting "unfair and deceptive
trade practices" without further legislative definition. The restricted approach
of the present act severely limits its usefulness as a consumer protection device.
Enforcement Powers. The Florida Act was drafted with the enforcement
problems of the FTC in mind. Thus, the Act provides for temporary as well
as permanent injunctions. 38 The Commissioner of Agriculture is vested with
powers to investigate suspected violations 89 and injunctions may be issued
whenever the Commission has "probable cause to believe that any person
is willfully and knowingly using or is about to use" a deceptive sales practice. 4° If the injunction is violated, a civil penalty of 1,000 dollars per vio41
lation may be exacted.'
The requirement that a violation be "willful and knowing" before it may
be enjoined is a serious defect in the Act and imposes a substantial evidentiary
burden on the state. 42 In some cases the circumstantial evidence available
will be insufficient to establish the requisite intent. Even where intent can be
proved, the gathering of circumstantial evidence imposes. a considerable administrative burden on state officials and may delay prosecution of complaints. 143 In any event, the knowledge or intent of the seller is irrelevant to the
central issue- whether the conduct in question deceives consumers.

1386. Power to make rules and regulations interpreting "unfair and deceptive trade
practices" was assigned to the attorney general under the Florida Act as it was originally
proposed to the legislature. Regulations were "not to be inconsistent with the regulations
and decisions of the FTC and the federal courts." See Fla. H.R. 581, 4219(3) (1970).
137. See generally Note, Consumer Protection Under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act,
54 IOWA L. REV. 819, 835 (1968).
138. FLA. STAT. §817.79 (Supp. 1970).
139. FLA. STAT. §§817.77 (5), 817.79 (Supp. 1970).
140. FiA. STAT. §817.79 (Supp. 1970).
141. FLA. STAT. §817.82 (Supp. 1970).
142. See generally Comment, Consumer Protection in Michigan: Movement towards
Some Long-Needed Reforms, 68 MicH. L. REv. 926, 973 n.301 (1970). The requirement
of a showing of intent to enjoin consumer frauds is occasionally found in other state
statutes. See, e.g., IowA CODE §713.24 (1966).
143. But see Note, Consumer Protection Under the Iowa Consumer Fraud Act, 54
IowA L REv. 319 (1968), which offers this appraisal: "As a practical matter, the intent
requirement is less an obstacle to enforcement than might be supposed. The injunction
and dissolution sanctions of the Act are aimed at those who exhibit a general pattern of
fraudulent activity. In these cases intent can easily be shown by circumstantial evidence.
Moreover, -in cases where the violations are minor or the conduct is only questionable,
the parties are almost always willing to enter into consent orders and make restitution,
without resort to litigation, in order to avoid undesirable publicity and legal expenses."
Id. at 326.
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Another weakness of the proscribed procedure is that the statute does not
permit an injunction against prospective deceptive trade practices. An injunction under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act
may not issue to prohibit future use by a merchant of a deceptive practice
previously used if it cannot be proved he is presently using or contemplating
use of the deceptive activity.1 44 Thus, it may be possible for a dealer, by
desisting temporarily from the illegal conduct, to defeat the issuance of an
injunction unless the attorney general can show there is reason to believe that
the dealer's deceptive practices will continue."45 This poses significant evidentiary problems. A model statute drafted by the Council of State Governments provides for this situation by allowing an injunction to issue on the
basis of past actions as well as present and future actions.' 4 This useful
47
addition to the Act was not included in the final Florida legislation."
Enforcement of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act
is facilitated by a provision allowing the Commissioner to accept assurances
of voluntary discontinuance of deceptive practices. 48 Assurances of discontinuance allow the businessman to agree informally to discontinue the disputed
practices. Although the use of temporary injunctions reduces the need for
voluntary discontinuances, such agreements obviate the necessity of litigation
and can be a more expeditious and economical method of obtaining compliance.' 4 9 Moreover, assurances of discontinuance provide a flexible tool for
agreement in cases of a less serious nature. 5 0 The net effect of this provision
is to allow a consumer protection office to more effectively aid consumers by
handling an increased caseload.

Jurisdiction. Jurisdictional problems arise from the fact that the Florida
Act is not restricted to the regulation of intrastate activities. The initial
question is whether Congress has preempted regulation of interstate business
fraud by passage of the Federal Trade Commission Act. In addition, it must
be resolved whether an FTC cease-and-desist order against a specific business
precludes seeking an injunction under the Florida Act and whether in a given
instance, state regulations concerning unfair trade practices may be an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
There seems to be little problem with the preemption question. Because
of the inherent manpower and budget limitations that prevent the effective
management of consumer protection on the national level, it is unlikely that
federal legislation will be held to preempt state action against interstate
sellers. This is particularly true since there appears to be no pressing need for

144. See FLA. STAT. §817.79 (Supp. 1970); cf. Comment, supra note 142, at 978 n.301.
145. Comment, supra note 142, at 973 n.501.
146. CoUNcIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, MoDEL UNFAIR TRADE PAcncE AcT §5 (1969).
147. See FA. STAT. §817.79 (Supp. 1970).
148. FLA. STAT. §817.80 (Supp. 1970).
149. Note, supra note 137, at 335.
150. Note, supra note 137, at 335.
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national uniformity in deceptive trade regulations.15 Similarly, the regulation
of deceptive practices in the sales market is a matter of valid local concern
and is unlikely to be held to be a burden on interstate commerce; at least
where the transaction occurs primarily and substantially within the state seeking to regulate it.152 Finally, possible state and federal action on the same case is
more a question of duplication than of conflict.153 Such duplication is unlikely
to be a significant problem if there is communication between state and federal agencies on such matters. In many cases federal action is likely to be deferred to state action because of the advantage of a temporary injunction over
a cease-and-desist order.
Compensation and Class Actions. Another area in which the Florida Act
seems to be deficient is in securing compensation for defrauded consumers. At
first glance the Act seems sufficient. Most complaints received by consumer
protection agencies never reach the injunction stage, 154 but are informally
settled by bringing the consumer and businessman together or by mediation
of the complaint by the agency. 55 Such action can secure significant restitution
to consumers; for example, the New York State Consumer Protection Bureau
alone secured over $1 million for defrauded consumers in 1966V'O These figures, however, can be misleading. Often the dollar recovery on a consumer
complaint is inadequate because the agency is beset by more complaints than it
can prosecute and is willing to settle for a small amount. 57 In cases where the
complaint results in proceedings for an injunction, the Act does not provide for
restitution to defrauded consumers. The Commissioner could be authorized
to seek restitution or some other form of relief for consumers 55 and thereby
151. See People v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 238 Cal. App. 2d 333, 147 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1967):
"Not only is there no conflict between the state and federal regulations, but there is

nothing to suggest that Congress intended that its legislation in this field be exclusive.
The operation of dance studios is primarily a local affair, as contrasted with fields . . .
with which the pre-emption cases have been concerned. There is no reason to think . . .
that Congress has yet decided to take over the field of fraudulent and unfair business
practices to the exclusion of traditional state regulation under the police power." Id. at
345, 47 Cal. Rptr. 708. See also Double Eagle Lubricants, Inc. v. Texas, 248 F. Supp. 515

(N.D. Tex. 1965). For an example of a federal act that explicitly preempts state legislation
see Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §1635 (Supp. 1970) (finance charge disclosure).
152. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93 A, § (3)(1)(a) (Supp. 1969), for statutory
adoption of this in-state standard.
153. See Dixon, Section 5 of the FTC Act and State Legislation Dealing with Deceptive
Acts-Is There a Conflict?, 1968 N.Y. STATEB AR Ass'N, ANTTrrusr LAW SYMPosIUM 76, 78, 86.
154. For example, approximately 95% of the complaints reported to the Iowa Consumer Fraud Division never reached formal action. See Note, supra note 137, at 337 n.120.
155. Note, supra note 137, at 337.
156. This amount is a compilation of mediation efforts, stipulations in voluntary
compliance orders, and court awards. See L. Lefkowitz, Enforcement of Laws Against
Fraud and Deception Now-An Inside Look at the Functioning of the Attorney General's
Office, 1968 N.Y. STATE BAR Ass'N, ANrrraUST LAw SYMPOsiUM 89, 94.
157. See generally Schrag, Bleak House 1968: A Report on Consumer Test Litigation, 44
N.Y.U.L. Rv. 115 (1969).
158. The more recent unfair trade practice statutes have included such a provision.
See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §49-15-13 (Supp. 1969).
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eliminate the necessity for subsequent suits to obtain compensation. In the
alternative, the Act could provide for assistance to consumers in private suits
for compensation brought after the Government has obtained an injunction.
Several provisions could be adopted to aid the consumer in a private suit.
First, in order to reduce the evidentiary burden on consumers any judgment
against a seller issued by the court in a government suit for injunction could
be made prima facie evidence in a subsequent consumer suit for compensation.159 Thus, the consumer would only bear the burden of proving the extent
of his damages. Second, an attempt could be made to remove the financial
burden of suit by authorizing the award of triple damages or attorney's fees,
at least in instances of intentional violations.160 Neither attorney's fees nor
punitive damages would appreciably benefit the consumer, however, if he were
required to prove de novo the existence of an intentional violation.' 6' Introduction of a successful government suit as prima fade evidence of fraud would
remove the consumer's need to prove intent since intent is an essential part
of a government injunction suit. Every consumer who could prove damages
would consequently be assured of compensation as well as attorney's fees.
Hence, the award of punitive damages or attorney's fees for willful violations
would be useful within the context of the present Act.
The Act makes no provision for class actions, although class actions are
perhaps the best hope of securing compensation for defrauded consumers. A
class action reduces legal fees to individual consumers by spreading the cost
among the members of the class and aids legal service organizations and consumer cooperatives by enabling them to represent a large number of clients
in a single proceeding. In addition, consumer class actions eliminate wasteful
multiplicity of suits and may encourage attorneys to undertake representation
because of the possibility of significant remuneration. Although there is some
ground for maintaining a class action under current law,1 62 class actions in
Florida,'6 as well as in most states,'8 4 would probably require statutory
authorization.165
159. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93a, §10 (Supp. 1969).
160. E.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 93a, §9 (Supp. 1969) (knowing violation not
required, award discretionary with the court); UNIFORM UNFAIR TRADE PRAcnCS Acr §7

(1969) (final version not yet adopted by committee). See also FLA. STAT. §817.72(2) (1969)
(award of attorney's fees for willful violation of Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act).

161. See Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1,
46 (1969). The availability of attorney's fees to successful consumers has been criticized as
placing too much of a burden on legitimate business. See Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems, 48 B.U.L. REv. 559, 570

(1968).

162. See generally Rice, supra note 91, at 579-83. See also Starrs, The Consumer Class
Action, 49 B.U.L. REv. 211, 407 (1969); Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 23,
The Class Action Device and Its Utilization, 22 U. FA. L. Rxv. 631 (1970).
163. See, e.g., Osceola Groves, Inc. v. Wiley, 78 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1955), where several
plaintiffs who had entered into sales and lease agreements with defendants sought to bring
an accounting and other relief on behalf of themselves and those similarly situated. The
court refused to allow the action since there was no common right of recovery in the class.
Florida class action cases are discussed in Starrs, supra note 162, at 450-53.
164. See Starrs, supra note 162 and Note, supra note 162 for a complete survey of class
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Business has generally opposed consumer class actions by arguing that it
would encourage unethical attorneys to solicit claims and increase the number of frivolous suits.1 66 Nevertheless, there is no evidence that the new federal
truth-in-lending statutory provision for class actions has been used to harass
lenders; to this date less than one dozen actions have been filed under its
provisions.167 However, assuming arguendo that harrassment of business is a
byproduct of class actions, disregarding this form of action entirely or requiring
the government to first secure an injunction against the seller's deceptive practices seems unjustifiably severe.16 Other alternatives are available. Any unethical practices incident to class actions could be minimized through the use
of adequate discovery devices and supervision of the conduct of attorneys by
bar associations.8 9 Solicitation of class action members could be controlled by
requiring court approval of attorney action at each stage of suit.170 Fear of
coerced out-of-court settlements could be allayed by requiring judicial approval of all settlements. Such a procedure would assure defendants freedom from
having to buy off unfounded daims.'71 Consumer class actions would seem
too effective in securing adequate compensation for small claimants and
thereby deterring fraud to be omitted from comprehensive consumer pro,tectionlegislation.
CONCLUSION

There is no single answer to the problems facing consumers. Two things
are apparent, however. First, case law alone cannot effectively deal with the
action cases. Consumer class actions are not used in federal courts because the $10,000
amount in controversy cannot be aggregated among the class. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S.

332 (1969).
165. Several proposals enabling consumers to bring class actions in federal courts were
introduced in Congress in 1970. The Administration proposal requires a successful injunction
to be obtained by the FTC before consumers can sue. It is also limited to eleven specific
classes of fraud. Other bills provide a federal forum to hear state fraud cases and do not
require the Government to sue first. These proposals are examined in Note, Consumer
Protection-The Proposed Class Action Statute, 44 TULANE L. Rxv. 580 (1970). See also
Hearings on H.R. 14931 and Other Class Action Bills Before the Subcomm. on Consumer
Protection of the House Comm. on Commerce and Finance, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
166. See generally Hearings on HR. 14931, supra note 165.
167. Hearings on HR. 14931, supra note 165, at 354.
168. One defect of the latter proposal is that the Government can prosecute only a
small fraction of consumer fraud cases. See Hearings on HR. 14931, supra note 165, at 46.
With government involvement limited to significant test cases and prior government action
necessary, the normal consumer is unable to obtain compensation.
169. ABA CODE OF PROFMssIONAL RrsoNsmutrry AND CANONS oF JMUDIet
A E cs, effective in Florida, forms one basis of disciplinary proceedings. Disciplinary Rule 2-104(5), for
example, prohibits attorneys from soliciting participants in class action litigaton.
170. Once the attorney has established to the satisfaction of the court that a class action
really exists he may ask the court for guidelines permitting interviews of the prospective
members of the class in such a way as to insulate them from any possibility of solicitation.
This procedure was suggested by the Committee on Legal Ethics and Grievances of the
Bar Association of the District of Columbia in answer to an inquiry by one of its members.
See Starrs, supra note 162, at 409.
171. This procedure is followed under the new Federal Rule 23. Fan. RuLE Civ. P. 23 (e).
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